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ABSTRACT
We examine the issue of password length leakage via encrypted
traffic i.e., bicycle attacks. We aim to quantify both the prevalence of
password length leakage bugs as well as the potential harm to users.
In an observational study, we find that most of the Alexa top 100
rates sites are vulnerable to bicycle attacks meaning that an eaves-
dropping attacker can infer the exact length of a password based
on the length the encrypted packet containing the password. We
discuss several ways in which an eavesdropping attacker could link
this password length with a particular user account e.g., a targeted
campaign against a smaller group of users or via DNS hijacking for
larger scale campaigns. We next use a decision-theoretic model to
quantify the extent to which password length leakage might help
an attacker to crack user passwords. In our analysis, we consider
three different levels of password attackers: hacker, criminal and
nation-state. In all cases, we find that such an attacker who knows
the length of each user password gains a significant advantage over
one without knowing the password length. As part of this analysis,
we also release a new differentially private password frequency
dataset from the 2016 LinkedIn breach using a differentially private
algorithm of Blocki et al. (NDSS 2016) to protect user accounts.
The differentially private dataset contains frequency lists split by
length which allows us to simulate an online attacker’s Bayesian
updates after obtaining the length of a password. The LinkedIn fre-
quency corpus is based on over 170 million passwords making it the
largest frequency corpus publicly available to password researchers.
While the defense against bicycle attacks is straightforward (i.e.,
ensure that passwords are always padded before encryption), we
discuss several practical challenges organizations may face when
attempting to patch this vulnerability. We advocate for a new W3C
standard on how password fields are handled which would effec-
tively eliminate most instances of password length leakage.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In any efficient encryption scheme there is necessarily some rela-
tionship between plaintext length and ciphertext length e.g., con-
sider encrypting a 2MB jpeg image vs encrypting a 2GB mp4 movie.
Vincent Guido [72] observed that (unpadded) SSL traffic can leak
information about password lengths, and introduced the name “bi-
cycle attack” in reference to the fact that a gift-wrapped bicycle
still looks like a bicycle. Thus, whenever plaintext-length might be
viewed as a sensitive attribute it is recommended that an application
developer should pad the plaintext message before encryption [29].
For example, the RFC for TLS 1.2 includes the following caveat:
Note in particular that type and length of a record
are not protected by encryption. If this informa-
tion is itself sensitive, application designers may
wish to take steps (padding, cover traffic) to mini-
mize information leakage.
Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) ciphers
simultaneously guarantees both message integrity and confiden-
tiality. A recent longitudinal study of TLS Deployment found a
dramatic rise in the percentage of TLS connections using AEAD ci-
pher such as AES128-GCM, AES256-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305
since 2013 [55] i.e., roughly 80% of TLS connections used either
AES128-GCM or AES256-GCM in April, 2018. In all three AEAD
schemes there is a one to one relationship between the length of
some ciphertext and the length of the original plain text message.
This 1-1 relationship can be viewed as a feature of the cipher as
it allows for significantly shorter ciphertexts i.e., a 2 byte mes-
sage would not need to be padded to a 16-byte (AES128-GCM) or
32-byte message (AES256-GCM) before encryption. However, the
1-1 relationship means that an eavesdropping attacker to infer the
exact length of each transmitted message from the intercepted ci-
phertext. The responsibility of identifying cases where the length
of a plaintext message is potentially sensitive and ensuring that
such messages are appropriately padded is left to the application
developer.1
Arguably, passwords provide a clear example where the mes-
sage length is a sensitive attribute. Broadly speaking there are two
categories of password guessing attacks: online attacks and offline
attacks. In both attacks, the adversary attempts to gain access to
some user’s account by repeatedly guessing different possible pass-
words from a password cracking dictionary. While offline attacks
are more dangerous they require the attacker to first hack into an
authentication server to steal the password hash whereas online
1For example, the RFC for TLS 1.3 [62] explicitly says “Selecting a padding policy that
suggests when and how much to pad is a complex topic and is beyond the scope of
this specification.”
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attacks can be mounted at any time. Even though an online attacker
is rate-limited these attacks can be surprisingly effective, especially
when the attacker has targeted background information about each
user e.g., DOB, address, phone number [73]. One defense is to rate
limit the attacker by locking the account after several incorrect
guesses within a fixed time window [1] or by requiring the user to
solve CAPTCHA challenges [52] in between consecutive incorrect
guesses. However, a stricter policy is more likely to inconvenience
honest users who might forget/mistype their password. Further-
more, a password spraying attacker will attempt to overcome these
restrictions by cycling through many different accounts that the
attacker would like to crack e.g., the attacker might try 3 guesses
per day per user account while still attempting submitting thou-
sands/millions of password guesses per day against a different user
account. An online/offline password attacker who knows the length
of a user’s password can potentially obtain a significant advantage
in eliminating guesses from the cracking dictionary of the wrong
length.
In this paper we aim to answer two key research questions: 1)
Howmanyweb sites are potentially vulnerable to bicycle attacks? 2)
How does password length leakage impact the fraction of passwords
that an attacker would crack in an online/offline attack?
2 CONTRIBUTIONS
Observational Study. We conducted an observational study of
AES-GCM traffic to see if application designers took appropriate
steps (padding) to prevent password length leakage 2 In our ob-
servational study we find that there is a widespread failure to pad
passwords before encryption e.g., at least 84 of the Alexa Top 100
pages are vulnerable to bicycle attacks. As a concrete example, we
demonstrate how an eavesdropping attacker can infer the exact
lengths of Gmail passwords and Chase Bank passwords by moni-
toring encrypted traffic between the user and the authentication
server.
One challenge an eavesdropping attackermight face in exploiting
this vulnerability is linking specific usernames to IP addresses. For
example, an eavesdropping attacker can easily extract the length of
a password from the encrypted packets exchanged between a client
(e.g., user) and server (e.g., Gmail/Chase Bank), but this information
is less useful to an attacker if the packet (from which password
length can be inferred) cannot be linked to a specific user account.
A targeted eavesdropping attacker might choose to target specific
users (e.g., by sniffing traffic on the home WiFi network), but for
a password spraying attacker, this approach will not scale. If an
eavesdropping attacker can exploit some other vulnerability to
link usernames with client IP addresses in bulk then a password
spraying attacker will also be able to infer the length of each user’s
password. We discuss how a sophisticated attacker could use DNS
hijacking to extract usernames from unencrypted traffic and then
associate those user names with client IP addresses in bulk.
Quantifying the Damage of Bicycle Attacks. Motivated by the ob-
servation that many high profile web sites are vulnerable to bicycle
2There are of course several other ciphers with a 1-1 relationship between message
length and ciphertext length. We chose to focus on AES-GCM as the cipher already
accounts for over 80% of TLS connections [55] and this number is likely to increase as
the Internet continues to transition to TLS version 1.3.
attacks we aim to quantify the severity of this vulnerability by esti-
mating how many additional user passwords an adversary might
successfully guess before/after obtaining the lengths of each pass-
word. To answer this question we adapt a decision-theoretic model
of a password cracking adversary of Blocki et al. [11, 13] which was
used to analyze the behavior of a rational offline password cracking
adversary. A rational password cracking adversary will continue
attempting to crack the user’s password until the marginal cost
of one more password guess (k) exceeds the marginal reward i.e.,
the value of the cracked password (v) times the probability (pi ) the
next password guess is correct. In the context of an offline attack,
the marginal guessing cost (k) is given by the cost of computing the
password hash function, while in the context of an online attack
the cost k might be dominated by the cost of solving a CAPTCHA
challenge.
Given a probability distribution p1 ≥ p2 . . . over user-selected
passwords (here pi is the probability of the i’th most popular pass-
word) as well as the cost/value the parameters v and k the model
allows us to predict how many passwords a rational attacker would
crack. Of course, if the attacker learns the length ℓ of the user’s pass-
word then we obtain a different prediction based on the updated
probability distribution pℓ1 ≥ pℓ2 , . . .. Here, pℓi is the probability
of the i’th most popular password of length ℓ. Our model also al-
lows us to estimate the attacker’s expected utility (reward minus
guessing cost) with and without knowledge of the password length.
Differentially Private LinkedIn Password Frequency Corpus. In
order to run the analysis we need to obtain empirical estimates
of p1 ≥ p2 . . . and of pℓ1 ≥ pℓ2 , . . . for each length ℓ. The RockYou
dataset (32.6 million passwords) allows us to estimate these values,
but the passwords in the dataset might have lower entropy since
the account is arguably low-value. The larger differentially private
Yahoo! frequency corpus (70 million passwords) [12] is not split
by length and as such will not allow us to estimate how many
passwords the attacker will crack when the length ℓ is known. We
address this problem by using a differentially private algorithm
of Blocki et al. [12] to publish a frequency corpus based on 174+
million cracked password hashes from the LinkedIn breach [47].
The frequency corpus contains several frequency lists f1 ≥ f2 ≥ . . .
and f ℓ1 ≥ f ℓ2 ≥ . . . for each length ℓ where fi (resp. f ℓi ) is the
number of user who selected the i’th most popular password of any
length (resp. most popular password of length ℓ). The frequencies
are perturbed slightly to satisfy the mathematically rigorous notion
of differential privacy [32, 33]. We use the LinkedIn frequency
to obtain empirical estimates for the password distribution e.g.,
pℓi = fi/Nℓ where Nℓ is the total number of passwords of length
ℓ. This allows us to estimate both the number of additional user
accounts that would be vulnerable to cracking when password
lengths are leaked as well as the utility gain from to password
length leakage. We believe that the frequency corpus will have
tremendous independent value for password security researchers
as it is more than twice as large as the Yahoo! corpus.
Our Analysis. We consider three categories of attackers with
different value to cost ratios (v/k): a hacker (v/k) ∈ {102, 103}, a
criminal (v/k) ∈ {104, 105} and a nation-state (v/k) ∈ {106, 107}. In
all cases we find that password length leakage significantly increases
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the fraction of accounts vulnerable to an online attack. For example,
our model predicts that a hacker with value to cost v/k = 102 will
crack 2.8% of passwords without knowledge of the password length,
but this number jumps to 5.8% when the length of a password is
leaked — an increase of 3%! For a nation-state attacker with a higher
ratio v/k = 106 we find that an attacker who knows the length of
user passwords will crack an additional 19.5% of user passwords!
Similar results hold for the RockYou distribution.
We also analyze the attacker’s utility gain when the password
length is leaked, which gives us an estimate on the value of the
leaked length information. For example, for a criminal attacker
with value/cost ratio (v/k) = 105 we find that the attacker’s utility
increases by 7203 × k where k is the cost of each password guess
and this gain increases to 1.3 × 105 × k for a nation-state with
(v/k) = 106. Thus, if we estimate that k ≈ $0.001 (e.g., the cost to
pay a human user to solve a CAPTCHA) the criminal (resp. nation
state) would choose to exploit the bug if the amortized cost of
obtaining each target user’s password length was at most $7.2 (resp.
$130). Given that the value of leaked length information is quite
high we conclude that it would most likely be worthwhile for a
criminal or nation-state attacker to obtain this information in an
eavesdropping attack.
Solutions. We demonstrate that leaking password lengths can
significantly help a password cracking attacker. Nevertheless, the
problem of password length leakage remains widespread. Given
the severity of the bicycle attack vulnerability as indicated by our
analysis above we argue that it is important to patch this bug
quickly. Thus, we conclude by discussing potential solutions to the
problem of widespread password length leakage. On an individual
level, the solution is straightforward — developers should always
ensure that passwords are padded before they are encrypted. We
provide a generic Javascript patch which could be implemented
immediately by many web services. However, we also acknowledge
patching a bug can be a slow process (e.g., see Heartbleed [31]), and
that oftentimes patches introduce their own vulnerabilities.
In general, we contend that it is inherently problematic to push
the responsibility of padding plaintext messages entirely to the
application developer whenever message length might be sensitive.
We advocate for changes to W3C standards which could effectively
eliminate bicycle attacks on passwords. In particular, we argue that
web browsers should pad password fields by default before a web
form is ever submitted. We also argue that other text input fields
should take an optional parameter which specifies that the input
length is sensitive.
3 RELATEDWORK
Vincent Guido [72] previously introduced the name “bicycle attacks”
in reference to his observation that unpadded SSL traffic can leak
information about the length of a password. Our contribution is
an observational study which demonstrates that such leakage is
widespread across the internet, and an empirical analysis of leaked
password datasets to quantify the advantage of a password cracking
who knows the length of a user’s password.
The phenomena of information leakage from encrypted traffic
has a rich history (e.g., [25], andDyer et al. observed that, in practice,
efficient countermeasures fail to prevent traffic analysis attacks [36].
In past observational studies, attacks against encrypted VoIP com-
munications were conducted byWright et al. [76, 77]. Knowledge of
the underlying variable bit encoding and length preserving ciphers
were used to derive intelligence on the language spoken and known
phrases. Specifically, machine learning techniques were used to
gain specific information about a ciphertext. Further research by
White et al. attempted to build upon this research to gain more
generalized information about VoIP traffic [75]. Goldberg et al. use
the Gaussian-like unimodal distribution to retrieve latency between
keystrokes and ultimately derive their variance [45]. Separately,
Frosch et al. used the total source-destination metric, edit-distance
metric, and random metric to identify differences in encrypted traf-
fic for health care websites [41]. Unger and Goldberg discovered
techniques to identify common user actions such as clicking a send
button by analyzing the size of cipher messages on popular social
networking sites like Facebook and Twitter [69].
Other pertinent research includes Paul Kocher’s investigation of
timing attacks on public key crypto [53], analysis of SSH keystrokes
and timings by Song et al. [67], efforts by Fiore and Abadi in the ex-
ploration of symbolic techniques for examining cryptographic pro-
tocols [38], and later work in cryptographic protocols by Doghmi
et al. [30]. Also relevant is work by Borisov et al. involving "off the
record" protocols [19] and Chapman and Evans [24] pertaining to
blackbox detection of side-channel vulnerabilities. Additionally, vul-
nerabilities in mobile apps have been the foci of several researchers
including [26, 27, 43, 68]. Information leakage has also been a signif-
icant concern in Searchable Encryption as discussed by [23] among
others.
AlFardan et al. [6] showed how an eavesdropping attacker could
recover cookies via Bayesian analysis exploited weaknesses in the
RC4 cipher, though the eavesdropping attacker must intercept 234
encryptions of the cookie to succeed. Garman et al. [44] later im-
proved these attacks and showed how an attacker can recover
passwords from 226 encryptions with RC4. Both attacks exploit
weaknesses in the underlying RC4 cipher. While bicycle attacks
only reveal the length of a password an eavesdropping attacker only
needs to intercept one encryption of a password to infer the length.
The attack does not rely on any underlying weakness of the under-
lying cipher (e.g., AES), but instead relies on the assumption that
passwords are not being automatically padded before encryption.
In addition to the previously mentioned research, the human
propensity to select low-entropy passwords has been consistently
documented over several decades [15, 59]. Empirical studies have
shown that complex password policies requiring users to use capital
letters, numbers and special symbols in their passwords largely
fail to produce stronger passwords [54, 64], and complex policies
adversely impact usability [5, 39, 49]. Wang et al. [73] recently
found that online attacks can be unexpectedly dangerous especially
if an attacker has background knowledge (e.g., DOB, name, address)
about the target user.
Previous studies have explored the relationship between pass-
word length and password strength (e.g., [51, 70] . By contrast, we
are interested in studying how much damage occurs when this
length is leaked to an attacker. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first paper to rigorously quantify the damage due to password
length leakage.
3
4 PREVALENCE OF VULNERABILITY
A significant question to answer is just how prevalent password
length leakage is in practice, and whether or not it is prevalent
enough to be of concern. Our team first noted the issue during an
observational study focusing on samples of network traffic captured
from a VPN. During this observational study, it was noted that there
was a 1-1 correspondence between the length of a plaintext message
being sent and the ciphertext length. This was (in part) due to the
use of the AES-GCM cipher, where the length of a ciphertext is
in 1:1 correspondence with the length of the underlying plaintext.
As we have remarked previously this relationship is an intentional
feature of the AES-GCM cipher as it allows for shorter ciphertexts
and it is the developer’s responsibility to pad sensitive data (e.g.,
passwords) when length leakage is a concern i.e., see [29].
Initial Experiment: CiscoASA 5506. In our first experiment col-
lected and analyzed network traffic produced from the Cisco ASA
5506 appliance, one of the most popular VPN devices used for
connecting organizations around the world. The Cisco ASA VPN
device was configured to use TLS version 1.2 to connect AnyCon-
nect clients for remote access to the internal network. During col-
lection, it was observed that the Cisco ASA 5506 switched from
an encrypted TLS connection and used the Quick UDP Internet
Connection (QUIC) protocol developed by Google to improve per-
formance (the use of QUIC was absent in the Cisco documentation).
During this observational study it was noted that there was a 1-1
correspondence between the length of a plaintext message being
sent and the ciphertext length. This was (in part) due to the use of
the AES-GCM cipher in QUIC. In particular, the Cisco ASA VPN
device was not padding plaintext messages which allowed us to
easily identify specific events in an encrypted IRC chat session
i.e., client connection/disconnection and to derive the length of
individual IRC chat messages and discriminate between web traffic
and ftp traffic. One can easily imagine a setting in which such
leakage over a VPN network might be highly sensitive e.g. linking
two political dissidents who are chatting on IRC.
Experiment 2: Password Length Leakage in Gmail. Motivated by
the first observational study we sought to determine whether any
prominent web pages might be vulnerable to bicycle attacks. In
this study, we used the Chrome web browser, because, by default,
QUIC is enabled with Chrome. We employed a collection platform
using WireShark and allowed simultaneous collection on the in-
ternal and external interfaces to easily compare the encrypted and
unencrypted traffic. We then used our automated process to login
to Google Mail three times increasing the password length by one
character every ten seconds. We had a ten-second delay between
passwords entered as resulted in a pronounced signature when
reviewing QUIC network traffic in WireShark. Google Mail uses re-
CAPTCHA to rate limit attackers after a number of incorrect login
attempts. The ten-second delay allows us to manually solve each
CAPTCHA challenge within the ten second time delay built into
our observational study. We found that passwords were not being
padded before encryption as there was a trivial 1:1 correspondence
between password length and ciphertext length — see figure 6.
We then conducted a similar observational study for the banking
website for JP Morgan Chase using Apple’s Safari web browser
to observe TLS version 1.2 traffic. In all of our experiments, the
AES-GCM cipher was selected when we connected to JP Morgan
Chase. The results were similar to Gmail except that there was
a 1:2 correspondence between the number of characters in the
password and the length of the ciphertext — due to the use of
Unicode encoding instead of ASCII.
Alexa Top 100 Web Sites. Having found several prominent in-
stances where password lengths were being leaked we set out to do
a more comprehensive review of the Alexa Top 100 web sites [4].
The results were concerning. Gmail and JP Morgan Chase were not
isolated examples. Instead, we found that at least 84 out of the top
100 Alexa web pages at the time were vulnerable to bicycle attacks
as they failed to properly pad password fields when using the AES-
GCM cipher. In most instances, there was a direct 1:1 relationship
between password length and packet size (ASCII), but even in other
instances (e.g., UNICODE) we are able to infer the exact password
length from the ciphertext. The full details of this observational
study including equipment, setup, and details about ciphertext /
plaintext size ratios are located in the Appendix.
Exploiting the Vulnerability. The ease of conducting such an
attack makes it particularly concerning. It is quite possible to obtain
ciphertext length for particular users by observing wireless network
traffic in public places. Even more concerning is that we find that
84 of the Alexa top 100 sites leak plaintext length for password
fields. Given that these sites comprise a significant portion of a
typical user’s online activity this attack becomes even easier to
carry out. All an adversary needs to do it sit in a public area and
collect wireless traffic. They can then identify which site a user is
trying to access, look up the plaintext password length, and then use
that knowledge to assist them in other attacks e.g. online password
attacks.
There may be additional difficulties in running an attack like this
e.g. without prior knowledge it may be difficult to identify which
usernames are associated with which password lengths. These can
still be overcome in the context of more targeted online attacks. As
an example, an adversary targeting someone specific may be able
to send some traffic (like an email) to a user and see if they can
spot them receiving the message. They may also be listening in at
a more specific location (such as a home) where they already know
the usernames of those inside. Because the username and password
length combination must be associated to make any attacks feasible
we will be primarily focused on targeted online password guessing
attacks, rather than more general attacks such as an offline pass-
word attack following a password breach (even though length data
is also useful to adversaries in these situations).
Disclosure. This vulnerability was reported to the United States
Computer Emergency Response Team (US-CERT), Cisco, Google,
Apple, Microsoft, and JP Morgan Chase bank. Apple will use this
information to inform decisions about security transport protocols
in future products. Google is working with the Internet Engineer-
ing Task Force (IETF) to look at ways to stop information leakage
through the HTTP/2 standards forum and have notified the compa-
nies supporting the development of major web browsers.
4
5 EXPLOITING LENGTH LEAKAGE
In this section, we describe how a password attacker might exploit
bicycle attacks to gain an advantage. To fully exploit the vulnera-
bility an attacker needs to be able to eavesdrop on encrypted TLS
traffic, identify which packet(s) contain encrypted passwords and
link the source IP addresses in a packet header with a particular
username. We use Google Mail to illustrate how an eavesdropping
attacker can easily identify which packet contains the encrypted
password. This allows the attacker to infer that some Google Mail
user with a given source IP address has a password of length ℓ.
In Section 5.1 we describe the attack setup under the assumption
that the attacker has a target Google Mail user in mind and is
able to link the source IP address with the target user name e.g.,
a targetted attacker might intentionally sniff traffic on a public
WiFi network at a small coffee shop when the target user arrives.
In Section 5.4 we describe how a password attacker will proceed
once he learns the length of the target user’s Google Mail password
i.e., by eliminating passwords from a cracking dictionary with the
wrong length. In Section 5.4 we discuss how a sophisticated attacker
might exploit the vulnerability on amore wide spread scale by using
DNS Hijacking to pair username with password lengths at scale
e.g., as part of a password spraying campaign.
5.1 Setting up the Attack
Attacker Capabilities. We first highlight the capabilities an at-
tacker must have to infer password lengths from encrypted Google
Mail traffic by exploiting padding failures. First, an adversary needs
access to a transit point between the client and server to collect
network traffic for analysis. Furthermore, the adversary must be
capable of determining the password length using signature-based
detection from different transport security protocols: TLS version
1.2, 1.3, and QUIC. Because these signatures could be computed
offline this is not a limiting assumption.
We setup our experiment by register for a dummy Gmail account
with a randomly chosen password, and then simulate a targeted
eavesdropping adversary by logging into the account while sniff-
ing network traffic on WireShark. A video demo of the attack is
available at https://youtu.be/TRkIymYJmzY.
Step 1 - We start with a dictionary of common user passwords
and choose a password at random from the dictionary subject to the
constraint that the password is consistent with Gmail requirements,
e.g., each password is between 8 and 60 characters.
Step 2 - We sign-up for a dummy Gmail account using the pass-
word selected in step 1. This simulates in a safe manner a user using
one of the common passwords in the real-world.
Step 3 - We sniff the network with WireShark and sign-in with
our newly created Gmail dummy account with the password used
in Step 2. We developed a signature that looks for the first QUIC
packet under 300 bytes i.e., the packet which contains the encrypted
password. The signature then determines the password length ℓ
by subtracting any overhead. After subtracting any overhead, we
identify that for every increase in 1 character in the password length
the encrypted traffic increased by exactly 1 byte or has a 1:1 ratio.
5.2 Running the Attack
After the attacker learns the length ℓ of a user’s password, the
attacker selects a dictionary containing the B most popular length ℓ
passwords. The attacker can now run an automated script to crack
the user’s password. This automated attack is possible whether
or not the attacker knows the length ℓ of the user’s password.
However, an attacker who knows the length ℓ can potentially crack
the password much faster.
The particular way in which the attacker will exploit this leaked
informationwill depend on the particular lockoutmechanism adopted
by the server. GMail uses CAPTCHAs [71] to rate limit an online at-
tacker i.e., by requiring the attacker to solve a CAPTCHA challenge3
after one or more incorrect login attempts. In all of our experiments,
we never encountered a scenario where we were locked out even
when running a script that continuously attempts. This solution
has the advantage that it is not susceptible to denial-of-service
attacks [3] wherein a malicious party attempts to lock an honest
user by repeatedly attempting to login with incorrect passwords.
On the negative, a determined attacker may continue trying to
crack the password for as long as s/he is willing to continue solving
CAPTCHA puzzles (or paying other humans to solve them).
Step 2 - We have an automated bot that iterates through each
password in the (pruned) dictionary and repeats the following steps:
Step 2.A - Our script checks the page to see if there is a CAPTCHA
challenge. When CAPTCHA occurs, we use an online CAPTCHA
solving service to pay real humans to solve the CAPTCHA chal-
lenge and copy the solution into the web form. In our demo, we
used the Rumola service to bypass Google’s reCAPTCHA service.
Step 2.B - Our script enters the current password guess in the
password field and we submit the web form to check for a successful
login. The script repeats Step 2 until the login is successful. We
remark that in all of our experiments we never encountered a
scenario where our attack script was locked out.
Other Defenses Against Online Attacks. There are several
different ways that an organization might defend against online
attacks on user passwords. One defense is to lock an account after
several consecutive incorrect login attempts. Lockouts can either be
hard or soft. A hard lockout requires the user to authenticate via an
additional factor, e.g., a security code sent via e-mail/text message, a
phone call and/or answering a few security questions. A soft lockout
expires after a fixed period of time, e.g., one hour or day. Stricter
lockout policies are associated with usability problems [20], and are
more vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks (e.g., an attacker can
lock a user out of his account by repeatedly attempting incorrect
logins) [3].
Pinkas and Sander [61] observed that an untargeted attacker
with many usernames may avoid lockouts by alternating guesses
between different accounts, and a determined attacker targeting a
3A CAPTCHA is a puzzle that should be easy for a person to solve, but infeasible for a
computer to solve using state of the art techniques. In a text CAPTCHA the user might
be challenged with an image consisting of moderately distorted numbers and letters
along with the instructions “You must type those letters manually to prove you are not
a robot.” Pinkas and Sander [61] proposed to mitigate the risk of online guessing is to
require the client to provide a proof-of-work (e.g., the solution to a CAPTCHA puzzle)
along with each login attempt [61]. There is a delicate balance between ensuring
that most human users can solve the puzzles consistently [21, 22], and ensuring that
a computer cannot solve the challenge. Advances in machine learning and neural
networks [42, 79] have made it harder to strike this balance.
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particular individual facing a soft lockout policy can avoid a lockout
by rate limiting guessing attempts. We remark that if successful
login attempts are visible to an attacker (e.g., via posts to social
media) then even an attacker facing a hard lockout policy can avoid
lockouts by only attempting to login after each successful user login.
We stress that in either case (soft/hard lockout or CAPTCHAs) the
attacker will benefit if s/he knows the length of the user’s password.
5.3 Linking Usernames and Password Lengths
To run the attack in Section 5.4 an attacker would need to associate
a user name for a specific website domain (gmail.com) with a spe-
cific client IP address. In this section, we demonstrate a plausible
scenario in which a sophisticated attacker could link usernames and
passwords with Google Mail using DNS Hijacking. This is simply
one plausible scenario in which an intruder can pair username and
password length pairs at scale e.g., as part of a password spraying
attack.
We remark that user ids often follow a predictable pattern e.g.,
jsmith for John Smith or jdoe for Jane Doe. Thus, any vulnerability
that allows an attacker to link IP addresses to a name (or user id)
will often allow the attacker to directly link the IP address to a
specific user id. Nation-state attackers might coerce an internet
service provider (ISP) to reveal this information directly, and a
criminal might be able to extract this information by infiltrating
the ISP.
DNS Hijacking. An attacker would start by creating a DNS
redirector by hijacking a legitimate DNS server:
The DNS Redirector is an attacker operations box which re-
sponds to DNS requests.
Step 1: The attacker would compromise legitimate DNS servers
through already stolen credentials [2].
Step 2: The attacker logs into a proxy box used to conduct non-
attributed browsing and as a jumpbox to other infrastructure.
Step 3: A DNS request for target[.]com is sent to OP1 (based on
previously altered A Record or NS Record).
If the domain is part of target[.]com desired domain, OP1 re-
sponds with an attacker-controlled IP address, and the user is redi-
rected to the attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Step 4: The attacker would then install a signature rule (e.g.,
SNORT rule) on OP1 to harvest cookies in unencrypted HTTP
traffic [37, 66] and record the associated client IP address with each
individual cookie. The attacker would then perform offline analysis
to discover usernames within the harvested cookies. The attacker
would then be able to build a list of associated user names with
their client IP addresses.
Step 5: The attacker would intercept on OP1 all HTTPS traffic
for target[.]com/login. In this, the attacker would then analyze
encrypted AES-GCM traffic to discover the password length. The
attacker would record the password length with the client IP ad-
dress.
Step 6: The attacker would perform offline analysis to associate
the user name from Step 4 and the password length from Step 5.
Discussion. A 2016 study from Columbia researchers conducted
an IRB-approved 30-day observation of their public wireless cam-
pus network and were able to intercept cookies containing 282K
accounts [66]. At that time the researchers found that all top Alexa
websites exposed usernames in unencrypted HTTP traffic. The re-
searchers found functionality across multiple cookies with different
scopes between encrypted HTTPS and unencrypted HTTP traffic
is complicated creating opportunities for exposure of private in-
formation such as usernames over unencrypted HTTP traffic [66].
Despite the impressive progress of the “Encrypt Everywhere” move-
ment over the last 4 years a substantial fraction (i.e., at least 20%)
of global web traffic is still unencrypted [37].
5.4 An Improved Online Attack
Suppose that our eavesdropper has inferred the length ℓ of an
encrypted password and linked that length with a specific user
account. Our password attacker can immediately prune his cracking
dictionary to remove any password that does not have length ℓ.
In our observational studywe found that GMail uses CAPTCHAs [71]
to rate limit an online attacker i.e., by requiring the attacker to solve
a CAPTCHA challenge after each incorrect login attempt.
We wrote a simple proof of concept script which automates the
process of an online attack against gmail. After the attacker learns
the length ℓ of a user’s password, the attacker prunes his cracking
dictionary to focus on the most popular passwords of length ℓ4.
Before submitting each password guess our script checks the page
to see if there is a CAPTCHA challenge5 . Whenever CAPTCHA
occurs, the attacker can use an online CAPTCHA solving service
to bypass Google’s reCAPTCHA service by paying human users to
solve each challenge—we used the Rumola service in our demo. The
script continues to submit guesses until authentication is successful
or until the cracking dictionary is exhausted.
We remark that in our experiments, we never encountered a
scenario where we were locked out when running our attack script.
Pinkas and Sanders [61] suggested the use of proof of work puzzles
(such as CAPTCHAs [71]) to rate limit an online attacker. One of the
advantages of this approach (in comparison to a soft/hard lockout
policy) is that it is not susceptible to denial-of-service attacks [3] e.g.,
a malicious party might attempt to lock an honest user’s account
by repeatedly submitting incorrect login attempts. The downside
is that a sufficiently determined attacker might continue trying
to crack the password by paying humans to solve the CAPTCHA
challenges.
Other Defenses Against Online Attacks. There are several
different ways that an organization might defend against online
attacks on user passwords. One defense is to lock an account after
several consecutive incorrect login attempts. Lockouts can either be
hard or soft. A hard lockout requires the user to authenticate via an
additional factor, e.g., a security code sent via e-mail/text message, a
phone call and/or answering a few security questions. A soft lockout
expires after a fixed period of time, e.g., one hour or day. Stricter
4Of course the same automated online attack is feasible whether or not the attacker
knows the length ℓ of the user’s password. However, an attacker who knows the
length ℓ can potentially crack the password much faster.
5A CAPTCHA is a puzzle that should be easy for a person to solve, but infeasible for a
computer to solve using state of the art techniques. In a text CAPTCHA the user might
be challenged with an image consisting of moderately distorted numbers and letters
along with the instructions “You must type those letters manually to prove you are not
a robot.” There is a delicate balance between usability and security i.e., ensuring that a
human can solve the challenge easily while a computer program cannot. Advances
in machine learning and neural networks [42, 79] have made it harder to strike this
balance. Several empirical studies have demonstrated that CAPTCHA challenges are
often difficult for human users to solves [21, 22].
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lockout policies are associated with usability problems [20], and are
more vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks (e.g., an attacker can
lock a user out of his account by repeatedly attempting incorrect
logins) [3].
Pinkas and Sander [61] observed that an untargeted attacker
with many usernames may avoid lockouts by alternating guesses
between different accounts, and a determined attacker targeting a
particular individual facing a soft lockout policy can avoid a lockout
by rate limiting guessing attempts. We remark that if successful
login attempts are visible to an attacker (e.g., via posts to social
media) then even an attacker facing a hard lockout policy can avoid
lockouts by only attempting to login after each successful user login.
We stress that in either case (soft/hard lockout or CAPTCHAs) the
attacker will benefit if s/he knows the length of the user’s password.
6 ATTACKER MODEL
We consider three types of attackers, their capabilities, and motiva-
tions to compromise an account. This will help us create a threat
model before gaining information leaked from GCM. We then can
compare any increases in capability or willingness to understand
the severity of the information leakage.
• Hacker The first attacker is a hacker and is capable of con-
trolling local networks, either on the Sender or Recipient
side of the connection. The hackers are motivated by the
challenge of compromising an account and does not look
to directly profit from the hack. The hacker’s willingness
to compromise an account waivers in the face of systems
with multiple security controls or a monetary cost of more
than 0-100 (USD), because the account’s perceived value
to hacker’s ego does not exceed its cost of 100.
• Criminal The second attacker is a criminal with the capa-
bility to control local networks and several organizational
wide networks. The criminal is financially motivated to
only compromise accounts whereby the payoff is at least
ten times the cost [50]. In most cases, the criminal will
spend between 100-1,000 (USD) to compromise an indi-
vidual account, because its perceived value to financially
profit does not exceed its cost of 1,000 (USD).
• Nation-State The third attacker is a nation-state. The
nation-state can compromise local and organizational net-
works and also control large segments of the Internet such
as Internet Service Providers. The nation-state is primarily
motivated by understanding threats to its citizens or inter-
ests and is only willing to conduct multi-year campaigns
against accounts threatening its security or sovereignty. In
most cases, we assume the nation-state is willing to spend
between 1000-10,000 (USD) to compromise an individual
account because the perceived value in the information
gained from the compromised account does not exceed
its cost of 10,000. While we do not know the targeted ac-
count’s subjective worth, we assume a rational adversary
is not willing to pay more than its perceived value.
A nation-state (and perhaps a sophisticated criminal)
might have the capability to eavesdrop on network traffic
on a broader scale to obtain (username, password length)
pairs at scale e.g., using DNS Hijacking attack as discussed
in Section 5.3. Similarly, a nation-state (and perhaps a so-
phisticated criminal) might have the ability to coerce an
internet service provider to reveal logs associating specific
users with the different IP addresses they were assigned
over time.
Password spray campaigns typically target single sign-
on (SSO) and cloud-based applications using federated au-
thentication. For example - in February 2018, the United
States Department of Justice indicted nine Iranian nation-
als a part of the Mabna Institute for computer intrusions
using password spraying [2]. While nation-states might
be intrinsically motivated to conduct persistent and long-
term campaigns, would an extrinsically motivated attacker
being as willing to use a password-spraying technique?
To help answer this question, we conduct an economic
analysis. If the information leaked doubles an attacker’s
capability or willingness to conduct the attack, then we
consider the information leak to be severe, because our
data suggests doubling the adversarial advantage begins
to show a clear change in the related monetary, decision-
making, and temporal characteristics. We want to create
a threat model whereby the attackers have a spectrum of
capabilities and willingness to compromise targets of inter-
est. Examples of severe information leakage might include
the compromise of the session key, allowing an attacker to
understand the underlying plain text without decryption,
or increasing the capability beyond their stated initial set
of capabilities to bypass a security control.
7 LINKEDIN PASSWORD FREQUENCY
CORPUS
We are releasing several differentially private frequency lists de-
rived from N = 174+ million cracked passwords from the LinkedIn
breach in 2012. The protocol was reviewed by the ethics board at
our institution. In this section, we describe the LinkedIn dataset,
the published frequency corpus and the differentially private algo-
rithm that was used to release it. The frequency corpus is avail-
able through the (currently anonymous) link https://figshare.com/
articles/linkedin_files_zip/7350287.
We remark that the Yahoo! frequency corpus [12, 15] is signifi-
cantly smaller (N ≈= 70million) and is not suitable for our analysis
in Section 8 because the password frequencies cannot be linked
with the length of each password. We use the LinkedIn dataset
in Section 8 to quantify the damages of password length leakage.
We also anticipate that the LinkedIn dataset will be of indepen-
dent research interest for password analysis (e.g., see [13]) as it is
significantly larger than the Yahoo! frequency corpus.
Background on LinkedIn Password Breach: In 2012 hackers were
able to compromise LinkedIn’s systems and stole over 177.5+ mil-
lion unsalted SHA-1 password hashes as well as other confidential
user data. LinkedIn responded to the leak by releasing a public
statement saying that they had invalidated compromised users’
passwords, requiring them to be changed and by encouraging users
to adopt two-factor authentication (see https://blog.linkedin.com/
2016/05/18/protecting-our-members). Because the passwords were
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stored in unsalted form and LinkedIn was not using key-stretching
tools such as PBKDF2 or Argon2 [8] at the time of the breach the
passwords were significantly easier to crack. KoreLogic, a cyberse-
curity company, cracked over 98% of these password hashes https://
blog.korelogic.com/blog/2016/05/19/linkedin_passwords_2016, and
agreed to allow us to generate an anonymized frequency corpus
based on these cracked passwords using the differentially private.
Password Frequency List: A password frequency list is a non-
negative list of integers f1 ≥ f2 ≥ . . . ≥ 0 where fi denotes the
number of users in a dataset who selected the ith most popular
password and N =
∑
fi denotes the total number of users in the
dataset. We also use f ℓ1 ≥ f ℓ2 ≥ . . . ≥ 0 to denote the frequency list
for length ℓ passwords, and Nℓ =
∑
f ℓi to denote the total number
of users who selected a password of length ℓ. Here, f ℓi denotes
the number of users who selected ith most popular password with
length ℓ.
As an example consider a toy scenario in which 12 users create
LinkedIn passwords. Suppose that f1 = 5 users select the password
“123456,” f2 = 3 users select the password “password” and f3 = 2
users select the password “abc123” and f4 = 2 users select the
password “letmein.” In this case the overall frequency list would
be (f1, f2, f3, f4) = (5, 3, 2, 2) with N = 12, but the frequency list
for length ℓ = 6 passwords would be (f 61 , f 62 ) = (5, 2) with N6 = 7
total passwords of length 6.
Security Risks: We first discuss the potential risk of releasing
password frequency lists without any noise. In the example above
the attacker happened to know the passwords for eleven of these
users. If only four of these eleven users selected the password
“123456” then the attacker who obtains the exact frequency list
(f1, f2, f3, f4) = (5, 3, 2, 2) abovewould be able to infer the password
of the remaining user.While this scenariomay seem a bit far-fetched
there are many examples of supposedly anonymized datasets that
were later de-anonymized when the attacker has some background
knowledge about the data e.g., [60].
Differential Privacy. We use the notion of differential privacy [34,
56] to ensure that the password statistics we release will not harm
individual users. Differential privacy provides a strong information-
theoretic privacy guarantees to each individual in a dataset, and
it has been an active area of research in the last decade (e.g., see
[57]). Informally, a differentially private mechanism for releasing
statistics about a dataset D ensures that an adversary cannot use
the output to make inferences about any individual in the dataset
except inferences that the adversary would have been able to make
without that individual’s data. Formally, a mechanism A which
takes as input a frequency list f1, f2, . . . with fi ≥ fi+1 and outputs
a noisy frequency list is (ϵ,δ )-differentially private if for all subsets
S of output frequency lists we have
Pr [A (f ) ∈ S] ≤ eϵ Pr [A ( f ′) ∈ S ] + δ ,
whenever f and f ′ are neighboring frequency lists which satisfy
the condition
∑
i | fi − f ′i | ≤ 1.
Here we can think of f as the original frequency list and f ′ as
denoting the frequency list after a particular user’s password is
removed. Differential Privacy cannot promise users that an attacker
won’t crack their password after we release the frequency list i.e.,
it is possible that the user picked a weak password that would have
been cracked in any case. However, we can promise each user that
the probability of this outcome wouldn’t have changed much even
if we excluded their data entirely.
Exponential Mechanism for Differentially Private Frequency Lists.
We used a differentially private algorithm Eϵ,δ developed by Blocki
et al. [12] to release the LinkedIn frequency corpus. The mechanism
is highly accurate and guarantees that (whp) L1 distortion is very
small. In particular, with high probability it holds that∑
i
fi − f˜i  ≤ O ©­­«
√
N + ln
(
1
δ
)
ϵ
ª®®¬ ,
where f˜ ← Eϵ,δ (f ) is the output frequency list and f is the original
frequency list.
We used the algorithm to publish f˜ (the original frequency list)
as well as f˜ ℓ (the frequency list for passwords of length ℓ) for each
password length value ℓ. Each individual password can contribute
to exactly two of these frequency lists. Thus, we used the privacy
parameter ϵ ′ = 0.25 to release each individual frequency list to give
an aggregate privacy value of ϵ = 0.5. In all cases, we set δ ≤ 2−100
so that this term was negligibly small.
8 SECURITY AND PRIVACY IMPACT OF
PASSWORD LENGTH LEAKAGE
In this section, we aim to quantify the damages of password length
leakage. In our analysis, we suppose that an online password at-
tacker attempts to crack the user’s password by repeatedly attempt-
ing the most popular passwords from a dictionary. We assume that
the authentication server uses secure CAPTCHAs to rate limit the
attacker (e.g., Gmail authentication). Thus, an attacker must pay
human workers to solve a CAPTCHA after each incorrect guess. If
the attacker knows the length of the password in advance then the
attacker can eliminate passwords from the dictionary.
We aim to answer the following questions: (1) How many ad-
ditional passwords will an online attacker crack when given the
length of each password? (2) How much does password length
leakage monetarily benefit the attacker? We stress that questions
(1) and (2) actually ask very different questions. The answer to the
first question tells us how many additional user accounts will be
compromised if password lengths are revealed to a rational attacker.
The answer to the second question allows us to predict whether or
not the cost of eavesdropping (equipment, manpower) on network
traffic outweighs the benefit of learning password lengths. To ad-
dress these questions, we adapt a game-theoretic model introduced
by Blocki and Datta [11] to model an offline password attacker.
8.0.1 Constrained Attacker. Before introducing our decision-
theoretic model, we first consider a constrained online password
attacker who either gives up or gets locked out after B incorrect
guesses. This will give us the chance to introduce key notation.
Notation Let D denote the distribution over user selected pass-
words P and we let pi = Prpwd←D [pwd = pwdi ] denote the prob-
ability that a user selects the i’th most popular password pwdi ∈ P
e.g. ,pi ≥ pi+1. We also Pℓ = {x ∈ P : |x | = ℓ} ⊆ P denote the set
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of all passwords with length ℓ and
pℓi = Prpwd←D
[
pwd = pwdiℓ pwd ∈ Pℓ
]
where iℓ is the index of the i’th most popular password in the setPℓ .
Observe that we have pℓ1 ≥ pℓ2 ≥ . . . for each ℓ ≥ 1. For notational
convenience we also write Pr
[Pℓ ] = Prpwd←D [pwd ∈ Pℓ ] .
8.0.2 Experiment 1: Unknown Lengths with B Guesses. A user
selects a random password pwd ← D and an attacker attempts to
guess the password online. We assume an attacker who knows the
distribution D, but not the specific password and that the attacker
either gives up or gets locked out after B guesses. The attacker
best strategy is to try the B most likely guesses in the distribution
pwd1, . . . ,pwdB . The attacker will succeed with probability λB =∑B
i=1 pi . Conditioning on the event that the user’s password has
length ℓ (i.e., pwd ∈ Pℓ ) and that the length ℓ is unknown to the
attacker, the attacker will succeed with probability
λB, ℓ = Pr
pwd←D
[
pwd ∈
B⋃
i=1
{pwdi } pwd ∈ Pℓ
]
.
8.0.3 Experiment 2: Known Lengths with B Guesses. This ex-
periment is exactly like experiment one except that after we sam-
ple pwd ← D the length |pwd | of the password is revealed to
the attacker. If the attacker knows the password length is ℓ (i.e.,
pwd ∈ Pℓ ), then the attacker succeeds with probability
λ∗B, ℓ =
B∑
i=1
pℓi .
If the attacker attempts the B most likely guesses before giving up
then he will succeed with probability
λ∗B =
∑
ℓ
Pr[Pℓ] λ∗B, ℓ .
Analysis. Table 1 compares the success rate of the attacker with
(λ∗B ) and without (λB ) knowledge of the passwords length for vari-
ous guessing limits B. The results show that the attacker’s success
rate increases significantly when the password length is known, e.g.,
a criminal attempting B = 105 guesses per user using the LinkedIn
distribution would crack nearly 35% of passwords with knowledge
of password length compared to 24% without this knowledge, or
about 50%. Table 2 compares the attacker’s conditional success rate
with (λ∗B, ℓ) and without (λB, ℓ) knowledge of the passwords length
conditioning on the event that the user’s password has length ℓ6.
Surprisingly, even for longer lengths such as ℓ = 30 an attacker still
may have a reasonably high success rate with a smaller guessing
limit B. For example, λ∗B, ℓ ≈ 4.5% at just B = 10 guesses against
the Rockyou list when password length is a large as ℓ = 30.7 By
6Table 2 only shows information from the Rockyou leak. This is because the calculation
of λB, ℓ requires a list showing the exact order of passwords as well as their frequencies.
It is not enough to know something like “there are 5 passwords picked with frequency
100". While you could identify which lengths made up those 5, we do not have the
specific order. It is possible to construct an estimated list by arbitrarily ordering those
5 passwords, but this would produce a noisy estimate. Thus we do not have accurate
values of λB, ℓ for the LinkedIn data
7Of the 1, 052 users in the RockYou dataset with length ℓ = 30 passwords
eight users selected “bebelicouz_05_mistme@yahoo.com” and seven users selected
“111111111111111111111111111111.” Another popular password of length ℓ = 30 was
the url http://www.rockyou.com/tos.php — selected by five users.
contrast, when the attacker does not know the length we have
λB, ℓ = 0 when ℓ = 30 even if the attacker tries up to B = 288, 046
guesses! This is because there are 288, 046 passwords with length
ℓ , 30 that are more popular than the most popular password of
length 30.
Limitations of the LinkedIn and Rockyou Datasets. A general lim-
itation of empirically defined password distributions is that they
almost certainly overestimate the probability of passwords at the
tail of the distributions, e.g., for any password pwdi that was ob-
served once in the Linkedin dataset we estimate that pi is at most
pi = 1/N ≥ 5.73 × 10−9. The Linkedin dataset contains 1.7 × 108
unique passwords and about 2.1 × 107 of these passwords are ob-
served exactly one time. Unfortunately, there is no way to be con-
fident about the true probability of an event that has only been
observed once. Thus, for B > 1.5 × 107 our estimate of λB may
be too high, and for B > 3.1 × 106 our estimate for λ∗B,6 may be
too high (there are about 3.1 × 106 length six passwords that were
observed more than once so our estimate of p6i may be too high
for i > 3.1 × 106). When B ≤ 106 we believe the estimate for λ∗B
is reasonable8. This means that there is some uncertainty about
our estimates of λ∗B for a nation-state attacker (B ∈ [106, 107]). In
our analysis, we use the symbol !△ to indicate that it is affected by
uncertainty about the tail of the password distribution.
As part of our analysis, we used empirical data from the RockYou
dataset [28], released in 2009, to define our password distribution.
The dataset was released in 2009 by hackers and remains one of the
largest available plaintext password datasets. One potential down-
side is that many RockYou users may have viewed their account as
low-value. While Bonneau [16] found that account value did not
appear to be correlated with password strength in his analysis of
Yahoo! passwords, we cannot rule out the possibility that RockYou
users were less motivated to pick strong passwords because the
account had low-value. However, we remark that it is possible that
a stronger password distribution would result in an even bigger
advantage λ∗B − λB for an attacker who learns the password length
since both λ∗B and λB would decrease.
8.1 Decision Theoretic Model
Experiments 1 and 2 consider an attacker that gives up after a fixed
numberB of incorrect guesses.While this model may be appropriate
in some scenarios where the attacker is eventually locked out,
it does not model scenarios in which guessing is throttled using
CAPTCHA puzzles (e.g., Gmail). This approach has the advantage
in that legitimate users will never be locked out (at worst they will
be bothered to solve a CAPTCHA puzzle). In this section, we model
a rational online attacker who will select a threshold Bopt which
maximizes his expected gain (expected reward minus expected
guessing costs). In other words, the attacker will continue attacking
as long as marginal reward exceeds marginal guessing costs.
8For each ℓ ∈ [6, 10] we have more than 1.6 × 106 (2 × 105) passwords of that
length that were observed multiple times. These lengths account for
∑10
ℓ=6 Pr[Pℓ ] ≈
81.4%(86.5)% of all passwords in the Linkedin (Rockyou) dataset. If we include ℓ =
5, 11 then we have
∑11
ℓ=5 Pr[Pℓ ] ≥ 85.9%(94.1%) and for both lengths ℓ = 5, 11 we
have over 7.8× 106 (8.75× 104) passwords of that length that were observed multiple
times.
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Table 1: Attacker Success Rate at Various Guessing Lim-
its with and without knowledge of the password length
(LinkedIn)
LinkedIn
Adversary type Hacker Criminal Nation-state
Guess limit B 102 103 104 105 106 107 !△
λ∗B 0.058 0.119 0.214 0.352 0.571 0.973
λ∗B − λB 0.030 0.048 0.072 0.112 0.195 0.394
λ∗B/λB 2.074 1.672 1.505 1.466 1.517 1.682
Rockyou
Adversary type Hacker Criminal Nation-state !△
Guess limit B 102 103 104 105 106 107
λ∗B 0.089 0.192 0.330 0.519 0.796 1.000
λ∗B − λB 0.043 0.080 0.107 0.153 0.255 0.133
λ∗B/λB 1.938 1.712 1.479 1.418 1.471 1.154
Table 2: Attacker Conditional Success Rate at Various Guess-
ing Limits with and without knowledge of the password
length
Lengths λ∗B, ℓ λ
∗
B, ℓ − λB, ℓ λ∗B, ℓ/λB, ℓ
limit 102 104 106 !△ 102 104 106 !△ 102 104 106 !△
5 0.228 0.670 1.000 0.183 0.447 0.458 5.067 3.004 1.845
6 0.116 0.430 0.888 0.071 0.207 0.346 2.578 1.928 1.638
7 0.077 0.353 0.760 0.032 0.130 0.218 1.711 1.583 1.402
8 0.080 0.281 0.698 0.035 0.058 0.156 1.778 1.260 1.288
9 0.083 0.262 0.698 0.038 0.039 0.156 1.844 1.175 1.288
λB 0.045 0.223 0.542
Marginal Guessing Reward. Suppose that a rational attacker has
value v for a cracked password. The attacker’s expected reward
is v times the probability he successfully cracks the password. If,
as in experiment 1 (resp. experiment 2), the attacker doesn’t (resp.
does) know the password length ℓ then the expected reward after
B guesses is R(v,B)  vλB (resp. Rℓ(v,B)  vλ∗B, ℓ ). The marginal
reward of one more guess when the attacker doesn’t (resp. does)
know the password length is MR(v,B) = R(v,B + 1) − R(v,B) =
vpB+1 (resp.MRℓ(v,b) = Rℓ(v,B + 1) − Rℓ(v,B) = vpℓB+1).
Marginal Guessing Costs. Assume that the cost of each additional
password guess is k (e.g., the amortized cost of paying a human
to solve one more CAPTCHA puzzle). If, as in experiment 1 (resp.
experiment 2), the attacker doesn’t (resp. does) know the password
length ℓ then the expected guessing cost is
C(k,B) = (1 − λB )Bk + k
B∑
i=1
i × pi ,
or if password length is known
Cℓ(k,B) = (1 − λ∗B, ℓ)Bk + k
B∑
i=1
i × pℓi .
To understand this formula, we first observe that the attacker incurs
maximum guessing cost Bk when he fails to crack the password,
which happens with probability 1 − λB (resp. 1 − λ∗B, ℓ ) when the
attacker is not told (resp. is told) the password length ℓ. If the
attacker is successful on guess i < B then the attacker only incurs
Table 3: Attacker gains for various account value to mar-
ginal guessing cost ratios
LinkedIn
Adversary type Hacker Criminal Nation-state
v/k ratio 102 103 104 105 106 107 !△
G∗/k 0.511 17.89 605.63 14652 296826 8024681
G/k 0.000 5.803 187.67 7448.19 165335 3085617
(G∗ −G) /k 0.511 12.097 417.96 7203.81 131491 4939064
G∗/G ∞ 3.083 3.227 1.967 1.795 2.600
Rockyou
Adversary type Hacker Criminal Nation-state !△
v/k ratio 102 103 104 105 106 107
G∗/k 0.959 30.168 1225.5 27053 552447 9.5E6
G/k 0.000 12.141 428.182 14576 297611 6.7E6
(G∗ −G) /k 0.959 18.026 797.31 23577 254836 2.8E6
G∗/G ∞ 2.485 2.862 1.856 1.856 1.422
cost ik and this happens with probability pi (resp. pℓi ) when the
attacker is not told (resp. is told) the password length ℓ.
Attacker Gain. WeG(v,k,B)  R(v,B)−C(k,B) (resp.Gℓ(v,k,B) 
Rℓ(v,B)−Cℓ(k,B)) to denote the attackers expected gain (guessing
reward minus guessing cost) when the attacker is not told (resp. is
told) the password length ℓ. If the attacker is rational the attacker
will select a guessing threshold B which maximizes his gain. We use
B
opt
v,k  argmaxB G(v,k,B) resp. B
opt
v,k, ℓ  argmaxB G
ℓ(v,k,B) to
denote the attackers optimal guessing threshold when not told
(resp. is told) the password length ℓ. We useG(v,k)  G(v,k,Boptv,k )
denotes the expected gain of a rational attacker in experiment 1.
Finally, we use
G∗(v,k) 
∑
ℓ
Pr[Pℓ]Gℓ(v,k,Boptv,k, ℓ)
the expected gain of a rational attacker in experiment 2.
Attacker’sMonetaryBenefitwhenLearningPassword Lengths:
We remark that G∗(v,k) −G(v,k) denotes the expected (per user)
benefit to the online attacker when learning the password length
ℓ. If this benefit #(AttackedUsers× (G∗(v,k) −G(v,k)) exceeds the
cost of eavesdropping on network traffic then it will be worthwhile
for the attacker to exploit the password length-leakage attacks
described earlier. Table 3 plots the value G∗(v,k) −G(v,k) for dif-
ferent v/k ratios. Tables showing the optimal thresholds BOPT...
which maximize gains at various v/k ratios can be found in the
Appendix in Table 8. From Table 3 we can see that the monetary
benefit of learning password length can be quite substantial. The
increased monetary benefit might entice additional criminals to
entire the password cracking game provided that increased mon-
etary benefit outweighs the cost of eavesdropping and linking IP
addresses to user ids. As Rob Joyce, Chief of Tailored Access Opera-
tions at NSA, said, “Don’t assume a crack is too small to be noticed,
or too small to be exploited.” [80]
Example: Suppose that it costs k = $0.001 (the approximate cost
of paying a human to solve a CAPTCHA puzzle) per password
guess and the value of each cracked password to a criminal is
v = 105k = $100. We have a v/k ratio of 105, and can look up the
value (G∗ −G/k) ≈ 7203 in Table 3 (using estimates derived from
the LinkedIn frequency corpus). We can convert this to a monetary
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Table 4: Advantages for several guessing limits
LinkedIn
Adversary type Hacker Criminal Nation-state
Guess limit 102 103 104 105 106 107 !△
λ
∗
v,k 0.007 0.028 0.090 0.191 0.378 1.000
λ
∗
v,k − λv,k 0.000 0.019 0.055 0.084 0.164 0.619
λ
∗
v,k/λv,k ∞ 3.182 2.586 1.785 1.766 2.625
Rockyou
Adversary type Hacker Criminal Nation-state !△
Guess limit 102 103 104 105 106 107
λ
∗
v,k 0.014 0.052 0.177 0.363 0.823 1.000
λ
∗
v,k − λv,k 0.014 0.034 0.104 0.163 0.446 0.000
λ
∗
v,k/λv,k ∞ 2.874 2.417 1.817 2.183 1.000
Table 5: Cracking estimates for attacks over time (LinkedIn)
LinkedIn
Days 1 guess/day 10 guesses/day 100 guesses/day (LinkedIn)
30 0.04(0.02) 0.08(0.05) 0.16(0.10)
90 0.06(0.03) 0.11(0.07) 0.21(0.14)
180 0.7(0.04) 0.14(0.09) 0.24(0.16)
360 0.9(0.5) 0.17(0.11) 0.28(0.19)
Rockyou
Days 1 guess/day 10 guesses/day 100 guesses/day (Rockyou)
30 0.06(0.03) 0.13(0.07) 0.26(0.16)
90 0.09(0.04) 0.19(0.11) 0.32(0.22)
180 0.11(0.06) 0.23(0.14) 0.37(0.26)
360 0.14(0.08) 0.27(0.17) 0.43(0.30)
value by multiplying by our k value. Here we see that knowing
password length gains us an average of $7.23 per password. Say
an attacker is targeting 100 people. So long as the cost of sniffing
network traffic is < $723 and it is possible for the attacker to link
user ids with each IP address it is worth the attacker’s time to run
the attack.
Number of Compromised User Accounts: We now seek to
quantify the damages of leaking password lengths to a rational at-
tacker. In particular, we use λv,k = λBoptv,k
(resp. λ∗v,k, ℓ = λ∗Boptv,k, ℓ, ℓ
)
to denote the probability a rational value v attacker succeeds with-
out (resp. with) knowledge of the password length ℓ and given
guessing costs k . We use λ∗v,k =
∑
ℓ Pr[Pℓ]λ
∗
v,k, ℓ to denote the
probability that a password is cracked in experiment 2 (We will
also use λv,k, ℓ = λBoptv,k , ℓ
to denote the probability that an attacker
cracks the user’s password without knowledge of password length
conditioning on the event that the user’s password has length ℓ.). Fi-
nally, we note that λ∗v,k −λv,k denotes the increase in the attacker’s
success rate when the attacker learns the password length.
Appendix Table 7 compares the attackers success rate with(
λ
∗
v,k
)
and without
(
λv,k, ℓ
)
knowledge of the password length
for various v/k ratios, and Table 4 compares the attacker’s success
rate conditioning on the event that the the password has length
ℓ (Appendix Table 8 shows the optimal thresholds BOPTv,k as well
as BOPTv,k, ℓ for various lengths ℓ). These tables show that a rational
attacker will crack many more passwords when given the pass-
word length. For example, a criminal attacker with v/k = 105 who
knows the password length will crack over 19% of targets from the
Linkedin data compared to just 10.7% of targets without knowledge
of password length. As another example consider a hacker using
the Rockyou data withv/k = 102. If the attacker does not know the
password length then his optimal strategy is to give up immediately
without attempting any password guesses. However, if the attacker
does know the length then he will crack about 1.4% of passwords.
We once again wish to stress the !△ symbol towards higher v/k
ratios, which denotes situations where overestimates are likely -
especially where values show the adversary would guess 100% of
passwords.
Online time-delayed attacks The models we have introduced
are based on the notion that an attacker can continuously try pass-
words. However, in many situations, there is some sort of lockout
that limits the number of attempts that can be made. In this case,
the adversary can run an attack over time to bypass lockout mecha-
nisms. Rather than being rate limited by a service like CAPTCHA, a
set number of guesses may be run per day. The models introduced
also provide insight into these types of attacks. To provide an idea
of what sort of advantage an adversary may have in this case, we
take Brostoff and Sasse’s recommendations that 10 attempts should
be allowed [20], however, we note that Bonneau and Preibusch
found that the vast majority of sites they surveyed allowed over 100
guesses with no restrictions [17]. In addition, the National Institute
of Standards and Technology recommendations allow for no more
than 100 consecutive failed login attempts before a lockout [46].
Table 5 shows the estimated proportion of passwords that would be
cracked over set periods of time given 1, 10, and 100 daily guesses.
Notation Remark: We use the notation λ... when considering
a rational (utility optimizing) attacker and λ... when considering an
attacker that is either locked out or gives up after a fixed number of
guesses. We also remark that we use ∗ to indicate an experiment in
which the attacker knows the length, and we use ℓ when condition-
ing on the event that the user’s password has length ℓ (whether or
not this length is known to the attacker). Thus, λv,k, ℓ denotes the
conditional success rate of a rational attacker who does not knows
the password length conditioning on the event that the users pass-
word is length ℓ and λ∗B denotes the success rate of an attacker who
knows the password length and tries exactly B guesses (without
conditioning on the event that the users password is a particular
length).
Differences Between Our Model and Previous Work[11, 13]. Blocki
and Datta [11] and Blocki et al. [13] to model an offline pass-
word attacker. By contrast, we consider online attacks. Blocki and
Datta [11] were focused on predicting λv,k to estimate the proba-
bility that a rational attacker cracks each password. While we are
still interested in this quantity we are also interested in understand-
ing the attackers gain so that we can predict whether or not it is
worthwhile for the attacker to eavesdrop on encrypted network
traffic.
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9 SOLUTIONS
At a conceptual level, the solution to the problem of password
length leakage is straightforward. Make sure that passwords are
always padded before they are encrypted. However, at a practical
level, the problem defies an easy solution because any solution
will require updates to web pages, browsers, and/or servers. We
contend that a large part of the problem is that the responsibility
of identifying and padding length-sensitive data such as passwords
has been largely pushed to the application developer.
The issue is increasingly pressing as the Internet increasingly
moves to AES-GCM with the advent of QUIC and TLS 1.3. In 2015
CBC mode was previously one of the most popular modes of opera-
tion in TLS connections [55], but as of 2018, over 80% of connections
use AES-GCM. While AES-GCM has many advantages over CBC
mode in terms of both efficiency and security9, CBC mode provides
natural padding i.e., messages are padded to 16-bytes blocks in CBC
mode while where there is a 1-1 correspondence between plaintext
and ciphertext length in AES-GCM.
Our immediate goal is to increase security for individual privacy
without requiring new transport protocol design or changing cipher
suites. Our solutions are focused around the Hypertext Transfer
Protocol layer (HTTP) to limit changes that could disrupt this eco-
system: 1) For HTTP 1.1 developers, we outline a framework to
change web pages alleviating some changes to back end servers. 2)
For future development, we recommend developers use the HTTP/2
standard and use its extension to implement padding. 3) We also
advocate that W3C be updated to specify that password fields must
be padded by default.
Our immediate goal is to increase security for individual privacy
without requiring new protocol design or changing cipher suites
and to do this, we believe developing a software solution at the
Hypertext Transfer Protocol layer is the best way to achieve these
goals.
It is important to develop a solution with compatible technolo-
gies. Since TLS version 1.2 and QUIC have been in existence since
at least 2013, we believe that using a client and server software
solution in JavaScript with the AJAX framework and JSON files
will meet our compatibility requirements for most servers and web
browsers. This will allow for an immediate fix to increase individual
privacy and security to websites containing sensitive identifiers
commonly found in web forms. Our general scheme is as follows
with three password transformation processes (hashing, padding)
options: The server will first identify web forms with sensitive
form fields and send the web form with a client-side script. The
client-side script will transform the password by either hashing it
or padding it. The client will submit the web form with the trans-
formed password to the server. The server will then decrypt the
information from the previously established secure channel (i.e.
TLS version 1.2, 1.3 or QUIC). Finally, the server will transform
the padded password back into the real password (or work directly
with the hashed password).
9As an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data cipher AES-GCM provides
both confidentiality and integrity. By contrast, CBC mode only provides confidentiality
meaning that additional steps (e.g., MACs, signatures) must be taken to guarantee
message integrity — a step that turns to be quite challenging to get right in practice.
There have been several attacks against TLS implementations of CBC mode including
BEAST (CVE-2011-3389), LUCKY13 [7] and POODLE [58].
Hashing. Hashing the password on the client-side is the most
straight-forward approach. Instead of sending the server the user’s
actual passwordpwdu wewould instead send the hash valueH (pwdu )
or H (u,pwdu ). Hashing the password has the benefit of being easy
to implement on client side and immediately protects the password
on the client and server to ensure some security protections from
both online and offline attacks. Intel and AMD processors both
support hardware acceleration for the SHA family of hashing al-
gorithms via the Intel SHA Extensions to the x86 instruction set
architecture so the solution could be made to be efficient. However,
this approach would require server-side changes10.
Note: It would be recommended that the server select a strong
password hash function H which is moderately expensive to com-
pute to protect against offline attackers [46]. PBKDF2 uses hash
iteration to increase guessing costs but is not memory-hard. Blocki
et al. [13] argued that functions like PBKDF2 which are not mem-
ory hard provide insufficient protection for low-entropy secrets
such as passwords. While the National Institute of Standards and
Technology has yet not vetted and approved any memory hard
function [46], the Memory Hard Function Argon2 [8] was selected
as the winner of the password hashing competition in 2015 [74].
The use of a memory-hard function such as Argon2 would be
best against offline attacks while protecting the length. A memory
hard function has yet to be vetted and approved by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology. Just In Time hashing (JIT
hashing) is an another alternative to hashing that does not deter
from the online experience of the user. As soon as the user types
in the first character(s) of their password, the JIT algorithm fills in
memory with the hash values for the characters the user has typed
[48]. JIT is not widely implemented in web scripting languages and
may be more difficult for common developers to implement widely.
Padding. Similar to hashing, padding can help hide the length of
the password. TLS (v1.2 and v1.3) and QUIC both support optional
padding parameters. In our solutions, the client-side script provided
by the server will use this option to ensure that the password field is
padded. This approach has the benefit of requiring minimal server-
side changes (apart from identifying web forms with passwords
and sending the appropriate client-side script) as TLS/QUIC will
automatically discard the padding on the server. The process is
opaque to both the developer and the user.
Note: Block cipher modes such as CBC would provide natural
padding, but CBC mode does not guarantee message integrity and
there have been several attacks against TLS implementations of
CBC mode including BEAST (CVE-2011-3389), LUCKY13 [7] and
POODLE [58]. We also find that GCM is much more efficient due
to native acceleration.
HTTP/2: For developers moving to HTTP/2, we recommend
using the HTTP/2 padding flag contained with the DATA frames.
DATA frames convey arbitrary, variable-length sequences of octets
associated with a stream. One or more DATA frames are used to
carry HTTP request or response payloads. DATA frames may also
contain padding. Padding can be added to DATA frames to obscure
10Instead of storing the salted hash of a user’s password the server would
have to store the hash of the hash e.g., (u, su , H (su , SHA3(u, pwdu ))) instead
(u, su , H (su , pwdu )). Until the user u provides the password pwdu there is no way
to directly obtain the new record (u, su , H (su , SHA3(u, pwdu ))) from the current
record (u, su , H (su , pwdu )) which is already stored on the server.
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the size of messages. It should be noted padding within HTTP/2 is
not intended as a replacement for general purpose padding such
as with TLS version 1.2. It is recommended intermediaries should
retain padding for data frames and drop padding for HEADERS and
PUSH PROMISE frames because an intermediary can change the
protections padding provides. This offers minimal protection for
HTTP/2 environments.
Long-Term Solutions. As for less immediate solutions, we sug-
gest the consideration of changes to future versions of standards
and protocols. In the case of W3 standards, they specify a special
input type for passwords in web forms. For example, the login
form for a well known banking website includes the following code
snippet:
<input id="usr_password_home" ...
type="password" maxlength="32"...>
As the above example illustrates a password input box allows for an
(optional) property called maxlength. We advocate for an update to
W3 standards to include a boolean “length-sensitive” attribute for
all input types. If this attribute is set to true then the browser will
pad the input value to maxlength, or in the event that the maxlength
attribute is not specified the browser could pad the input value,
e.g., to ensure that the plain text length is a multiple of 30. An
update to W3 standards would be easy to implement at the browser
level. Ideally, it would be nice to set the “length-sensitive” attribute
to true by default for the password input type. The advantage of
setting the attribute to true by default is that we would no longer
rely on a web developer to remember to set this attribute to true
for passwords. On the downside setting the attribute to true by
default may create backward compatibility issues with any web
server using an older version of the W3 standard.
To defend against password attacks (e.g., password spraying), we
suggest enabling multi-factor authentication for all internet facing
applications. Organizations should also align password policies with
NIST guidelines [46]. Some companies are adding new detection
and prevention tools such as IP lockout when analyzing sign-ons
to the same account from different IP addresses [65].
10 CONCLUSIONS
In TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2 (some ciphers) there is a 1-1 relationship
between the length of a ciphertext and the length of the correspond-
ing plaintext. The responsibility of identifying and padding length
sensitive data is pushed to the application developer. We conducted
an observational study of AES-GCM traffic (the most commonly
used cipher in TLS) which uncovered a widespread failure to pad
passwords. In particular, we found multiple high profile instances
where password lengths can be directly inferred from encrypted
web traffic. If an eavesdropping attacker is able to link the source
IP address with a particular user name (e.g., via unencrypted traf-
fic) then the attacker can directly infer the length of that user’s
password. We used a decision-theoretic model to analyze the advan-
tage a password attacker obtains by learning the length of a user’s
password. Our analysis shows that the advantage is substantial.
While there are good metrics about howmuch a particular cipher
reduces latency, there are fewer reliable models to help security
professionals quantify how many users might be susceptible to
intrusions and from which class of intruders (i.e. nation-states,
criminals, or hackers). Without this information, it will be difficult
for security professionals to make informed decisions about the
trade-offs between speed and security. As a necessary first step,
this research begins to quantify the cost an intruder would incur
to perform an online attack. This helps better understand which
intruders might be willing to endure the cost to intrude on when
conducting a campaign against a set of targeted accounts. As the
push for faster security transport security protocols continues to
grow, researchers will be challenged to balance the need for speed
and security. Ultimately, this research adds value by helping security
researchers better quantify and compare the specific trade-offs
between speed and security for a particular cipher suite used for a
security transport protocol.
10.1 Future Work
We have begun to quantify the risks of leaking password lengths.
There is a need to quantify the risks of leaking plain text lengths
in other contexts (e.g., short chat communications). In general, it
would be helpful to formulate clear guidelines to help developers
evaluate when plain text length should be viewed as a sensitive
attribute. When plain text length is sensitive there is a need to
provide developers with an easy method to obfuscate sensitive data
lengths, and there is a need to develop automated tools which could
audit code and identify instances where length-sensitive data might
not be hidden.
10.2 Recommendations for Users
We offer the following suggestions to users to protect themselves
against password length leakage attacks11. First, enable two-factor
authentication whenever possible. Strong two-factor authentication
will prevent an attacker from mounting an online attack whether
or not the attacker knows the length ℓ of your password. Second,
we recommend that users select strong passwords which don’t
occur in a password cracking dictionary. We recognize that this
advice, while easy to give, can be challenging to follow since users
typically have many password protected accounts [40]. However,
the additional risks from password length leakage may justify the
extra effort for many users. Mnemonic techniques [10, 78] and
spaced repetition [14, 18] may help to reduce the extra user burden.
Finally, users could also begin to use a password manager to gen-
erate unique passwords from one master password. This solution
potentially reduces user burden since the user will now only need
to remember a few master passwords. Second, the length of the
derived password for each domain is not necessarily correlated
with the length of the user’s master password. For example, Pwd-
Hash [63] derives a unique fixed-length password for each domain
based on the cryptographic hash of the user’s master password
along with the domain itself.
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A NOTATION GUIDE
Here we include a brief summary of the notation used in our analy-
sis. This is meant as a quick reference for intuition - for full defini-
tions see the main body of the paper.
pi The proportion of users who selected the i’thmost common
password
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pℓi The proportion of users who selected the i’thmost common
password of length ℓ
B The number of guesses an adversary ismaking in a password-
guessing attack
λB The proportion of passwords guessed in some attack with
B guesses. E.g. λ10 is the proportion of passwords an ad-
versary would guess with no additional information.
star (*) Indicates attacker knowledge of password length. No star
means the attacker does not know password length, and a
star means they do. E.g. λ∗B is the proportion of passwords
guessed in an attack where the attacker knows password
length.
ℓ Means the variable is only considering the list of passwords
of length ℓ. E.g. λB, ℓ is the proportion of passwords of
length ℓ guessed in B guesses.
v The value of a guessed password
k The cost of guessing a password
R(v,B) The expected reward an attacker would get in an attack
with B guesses against a password with value v .
C(k,B) The expected cost an attacker must pay to make B guesses
on a password list, with each guess costing k .
G(v,k,B) The expected gain (i.e. Reward - Cost) of an attacker mak-
ing B guesses with password valuev and cost of each guess
k .
BOPTv,k The value of B that maximizesG for some list of passwords,
value v , and guess cost k .
Bar (e.g. λ) Number of passwords guessed when using the relevant
BOPT value.
B ALEXA TOP 100
For the following Top Alexa 100, these websites used AES-GCM as
one of the potential cipher suites. In all cases, these websites did not
offer sufficient additional protection (i.e., padding) to obfuscate the
password length. Thus, if a Top Alexa 100 website uses AES-GCM,
denoted with a 1 in the table, then it was vulnerable to an attacker
inferring the length for a plausible attack outlined in section 5.
Additional tables
Table 6: Attacker Conditional Success Rate at Various Guess-
ing Limits with and without knowledge of the password
length
Lengths λ∗B, ℓ λ
∗
B, ℓ − λB, ℓ λ∗B, ℓ/λB, ℓ
limit 102 104 106 !△ 102 104 106 !△ 102 104 106 !△
5 0.228 0.670 1.000 0.183 0.447 0.458 5.067 3.004 1.845
6 0.116 0.430 0.888 0.071 0.207 0.346 2.578 1.928 1.638
7 0.077 0.353 0.760 0.032 0.130 0.218 1.711 1.583 1.402
8 0.080 0.281 0.698 0.035 0.058 0.156 1.778 1.260 1.288
9 0.083 0.262 0.698 0.038 0.039 0.156 1.844 1.175 1.288
λB 0.045 0.223 0.542
C PERFORMANCE COMPARISON AES-GCM
VS AES-CBC
We ran our own measurements to compare the performance be-
tween CBC and GCM. The results are shown in Figure 5. First,
Figure 1: Top Alexa 100 using AES-GCM
Table 7: Cracking data for limited guessing
Lengths λ∗v,k, ℓ λ
∗
v,k, ℓ − λv,k, ℓ λ
∗
v,k, ℓ/λv,k, ℓ
limit 102 104 106 102 104 106 102 104 106
5 0.060 0.522 1.000 0.060 0.249 0.315 ∞ 1.912 1.460
6 0.034 0.258 1.000 0.000 0.059 0.190 1.000 1.300 1.235
7 0.000 0.182 0.596 0.000 0.081 0.132 N/A 1.802 1.284
8 0.000 0.128 0.500 0.000 0.059 0.132 N/A 1.855 1.359
9 0.019 0.121 1.000 0.019 0.064 0.863 ∞ 2.122 7.300
λ
∗
v,k 0.014 0.177 0.822
we are producing a set of randomized bits to encrypt using the
SecureRandom function in Java and storing it in a 64 byte buffer.
Next, we then take the 64 byte buffer and encrypt it 100,000 times
on a 2.9 GHz Intel Core i7 with 16 GB of LPDDR3 memory. We
repeat the test 100 times and take the median score for the duration
of time to hash or encrypt the randomized data with or without
padding. The results are consistent with prior findings that GCM is
substantially faster than CBC mode due to native support for GCM
at the processor level. We remark that the use of the padding flag
in TLS has minimal effect on the impressive performance of GCM.
D ADDITIONAL DETAIL FOR
OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES
The general approach for these studies was to observe network
traffic for each service or function studied with transport security
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Figure 2: Top Alexa 100 using AES-GCM (Continued)
Table 8: Optimal Attacker Guessing Limit for various ac-
count value to marginal guessing cost ratios
LinkedIn
Adversary type Hacker Criminal Nation-state
v/k ratio 102 103 104 105 106 107 !△
BOPTv,k,6 1 10 736 10327 271903 5418647
BOPTv,k,7 0 4 570 8818 134534 6672366
BOPTv,k,8 0 4 199 4771 107888 14886616
BOPTv,k,9 1 2 168 4164 81901 8750881
BOPTv,k 0 3 164 3537 58638 1063939
Rockyou
Adversary type Hacker Criminal Nation-state !△
v/k ratio 102 103 104 105 106 107
BOPTv,k,5 1 121 1928 259169 259169 259169
BOPTv,k,6 1 30 981 20963 1947797 1947797
BOPTv,k,7 0 18 759 11077 227299 2506271
BOPTv,k,8 0 15 417 7919 168816 2966037
BOPTv,k,9 1 20 366 6708 2191039 2191039
BOPTv,k 0 7 320 6327 114760 14344391
protocols: QUIC, TLS version 1.2 and TLS version 1.3 (draft). The
first study looked at Google’s QUIC protocol in the Cisco ASA5506
enabled Virtual Private Network (VPN) while the second study
observed QUIC during the sign-in process for Google Mail. The
third and final observational study examined TLS version 1.2 during
Figure 3: Top Alexa 100 using AES-GCM (Continued)
Figure 4: Top Alexa 100 using AES-GCM (Continued)
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Figure 5: Comparison of performance for CBC versus GCM
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Figure 6: Relationship between password length and packet
payload length
the sign in process for online banking at JP Morgan Chase. As de-
picted in Figure 6, all three studies demonstrated an obvious pattern
between encrypted traffic and the plaintext length of passwords;
in particular, we observed a clear linear relationship between the
password lengths and the length of the encrypted payloads in the
respective packets.
Observational Study 1: QUIC in Cisco Virtual
Private Network
This observational study draws inferences from a sample of net-
work packets captured from a Cisco ASA 5506 VPN stream. This
study was a necessary first step in identifying vulnerabilities in
this VPN for future research. This observational study did not con-
trol confounding variables, because this would make it difficult to
understand the normal behavior of the encrypted VPN stream.
Phenomena and Variables. This study investigates phenomena of
information leakage from encrypted traffic. Specifically, this study
collected and analyzed network traffic produced from the Cisco
ASA 5506 appliance, one of the most popular VPN devices used
for connecting organizations around the world. This observational
study tried to answer the following research question: what infor-
mation, if any, can be derive from an encrypted Cisco VPN stream by
observing the source and destination Internet Protocol (IP) address,
the protocol used, the encrypted IP packet size, and the timestamps
for when packets are sent. Within this research question, we mea-
sured four (4) variables: what communication occurred, when did
the communication take place, where did the communication take
place, and who is involved in the communication.
Measures. To measure these variables, this study observed the
packet attributes. A comparison of packet attributes for encrypted
and corresponding unencrypted traffic was conducted to identify
any ordinal patterns among the packet sequence, source Internet
Protocol address, destination Internet Protocol address, protocol,
and packet length. These network attributes were observed using
packet length in bytes, the IP Addresses were in IP version 4 format,
and the communication protocol was translated from Hexadecimal
automatically fromWireShark. These attributes and these measures
served to help us comprehend the network traffic occurring during
a specific observation.
Sample. For each observation, the data was collected three times
and checked for consistency among the collections to ensure the
data was valid. If the three collections were consistent, then we
assumed that the network traffic was accurately collected for a
particular network function.
Procedures. This study used a certified Cisco network services
company to set up the Cisco VPN network to ensure the lab con-
figuration was correct. The Cisco ASA VPN device was configured
to use TLS version 1.2 to connect AnyConnect clients for remote
access to the internal network. This study also utilized a collection
platform that allowed simultaneous collection on the internal and
external interfaces for the Cisco ASA 5506 device. This approach
allowed for easy observations to compare unencrypted traffic inside
the VPN with the corresponding encrypted traffic immediately out-
side the VPN. For the internal interface, this study used a 192.168.1.X
C class network. For the external interface, this study attached the
Cisco ASA 5506 to a public IP Address in the C class range. For
VPN clients, this study created a specific 192.168.2.X C class pool.
This allowed the data to be distinguished between VPN clients and
internal devices. This setup allowed for easily correlation between
unencrypted traffic in the 192.168.X.X range to corresponding en-
crypted traffic from any Internet routable IP address. Next, the
internal devices, the Internet connection, and Cisco ASA 5506 were
all connected to a network hub. The hub forwarded all network
traffic to each device, and therefore, the hub allowed WireShark to
sniff all internal and external communication intended to transit
the VPN network.
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Next, this study observed common categories of Internet com-
munication. To represent more spontaneous types communication,
this study observed messages between two persons communicating
over the common Instant Relay Chat (IRC) service and to simulate
more continuous types of communication, we observed file trans-
fers using the common service File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Next,
we measured four independent variables: what, when, where, who.
To ensure accuracy, the data was collected three times and checked
for consistency among the collections to ensure the data was valid.
For what, the data compared packet attributes for encrypted and
corresponding unencrypted traffic to identify any ordinal patterns
among the packet sequence, source Internet Protocol address, des-
tination Internet Protocol address, protocol, and packet length. For
when, the data measured the interval between the first and last seen
occurrence of the suspected target source and destination Inter-
net Protocol addresses. For where, this study used trace route and
the WHOIS service to observe the source and destination Internet
Protocol address to identify the city locations. For who, this study
used the WHOIS service to expose the identities of the two parties
communicating.
We then reran our observational study using WireShark and
allowed simultaneous collection on the internal and external in-
terfaces for Google’s Chrome web browser to better study QUIC.
Again, this approach allowed for easy observations to compare
unencrypted traffic before transmission with the corresponding en-
crypted traffic after transmission. A comparison of packet attributes
for encrypted and corresponding unencrypted trafficwas conducted
to identify any ordinal patterns among the packet sequence, source
Internet Protocol address, destination Internet Protocol address,
protocol, and packet length. These network attributes were ob-
served using packet length in bytes with IP Addresses in IP version
4 format; as mentioned previously, the communication protocol
was translated from Hexadecimal automatically from WireShark.
During the course of our observations, it became apparent the en-
crypted traffic allowed for the determination of the plaintext length.
This in turn changed the focus of the research to determine how
much of an advantage, if any, an attacker gained from understand-
ing the plaintext length for passwords transmitted by QUIC, and as
we detail later, the researchers used a game theoretic model to bet-
ter understand how much, if any, adversarial advantage increased
when QUIC leaks the plaintext length for passwords.
Results: QUIC Leakage in VPN. During collection, it was observed
that the Cisco ASA 5506 switched from an encrypted TLS connec-
tion and used an experimental protocol by Google called the Quick
UDP Internet Connection (QUIC). QUIC was made to improve
performance. The QUIC protocol supports a set of multiplexed con-
nections over UDP, and was designed to provide security protection
equivalent to TLS/SSL, along with reduced connection and trans-
port latency. The use of QUIC is absent in the Cisco documentation.
To summarize, the identified ordinal patterns allowed observers
to successfully determine the types of communication being used.
Specifically, it is possible to identify when a user browses a website
or when a file is transferred. It is also possible to positively identify
when an IRC client connects and disconnects from an IRC server,
distinguish when online chatting begins and ends, and even derive
the total length of individual IRC chat messages. Below we briefly
describe our discoveries for each of our cases:
Web Traffic: After analysis of the collectedWeb traffic, an ordinal
pattern emerged. Packets corresponding to Web traffic used the
QUIC protocol and had a consistent total packet length of 1392.
This ordinal pattern allows an eavesdropper to create automatic
signatures to determine if Web services are being used.
FTP Traffic: Here too our analysis of the FTP network traffic
revealed an ordinal pattern. FTP traffic used the QUIC protocol
and had a consistent packet length of 1463. As was the case with
web traffic, this ordinal pattern allows an eavesdropper to create
automatic signatures to determine if FTP services are being used in
the VPN.
IRC Connect Traffic: In our observation of IRC connection traf-
fic, we saw that the first two packets sent during the IRC client
connect have a packet length of 119 and use the TLSv1.2 protocol.
The remainder of the packets that were sent during the IRC client
connect are sent from the server, using the QUIC protocol, and have
varying packet lengths. Each of these ordinal patterns remained
consistent when the client connect phase was repeated. It is impor-
tant to note that an IRC connection is salient in identifying a chat
session between two users.
IRC Disconnect Traffic: The IRC client disconnect phase was
similar to the client connect phase. The first two packets sent during
the client disconnect phase have a packet length of 119 and use the
TLSv1.2 protocol. The remainder of the packets are sent from the
server, use the QUIC protocol, and have varying packet lengths.
Again, each of these ordinal patterns remained consistent when
collection of the client disconnect phase was repeated. Again, it
was important to identify an IRC disconnection to later identify a
chat session between two separate users.
IRC Chat Session: The first two packets sent during the com-
munication phase had a packet length of 119 and use the TLSv1.2
protocol. The remainder of the packets had varying lengths, all of
which were less than 300 bytes. From these initial observations, the
QUIC packet sizes for IRC communication appeared to vary based
upon the length of the IRC message being sent. To investigate these
observations further, additional network traffic was collected. IRC
messages, composed of English characters, of character length one
to 100 were sent in half-second intervals while network traffic was
collected. The network setup for this research allowed the unen-
crypted IRC packets to be collected from the internal interface of
the Cisco VPN.
It is important to stress the increased risk from leaking – via
the VNP traffic – fine-grained information about the plaintext; for
example, one can easily envision a situation where the attacker can
uniquely identify the two parties in an IRC chat over a VPN that
otherwise would not have been possible if the leakage were less
fine-grained.
Observational Study 2: QUIC in Google’s E-mail
or Google Mail
In this observational study, we sought to observe if QUIC specifi-
cally leaks the password length when signing into Google Mail. We
again employed a collection platform using WireShark and allowed
simultaneous collection on the internal and external interfaces to
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easily compare the encrypted and unencrypted traffic. During the
course of our observations, it became apparent the encrypted traffic
allowed for the determination of the plaintext length.
Phenomena and Variables, Measures, Sample. The phenomena,
variables, measures, and sample are the same as in the Observational
Study 1.
Procedures. The procedures changed slightly for this observa-
tional study. In this study, we used the Chrome web browser, be-
cause by default, QUIC is enabled with Chrome. We then used our
automated process to login to Google Mail three times increasing
the password length by one character every ten seconds. We had a
ten second delay between passwords entered as this helped intro-
duce a pronounced signature when reviewing QUIC network traffic
in WireShark. Google Mail uses reCAPTCHA to slow the process
down, but we were able to manually enter the CAPTCHA challenge
within the ten second time delay built into our observational study.
Results: Password Length Leakage in QUIC. Our results suggest
the password length is easily identified in traffic analysis. The
encrypted packet length and the password length have a 1:1 to
ratio or as the password length increases by 1 character, then the
encrypted packet length increases also by 1 byte.
Observational Study 3: TLS version 1.2 in JP
Morgan Chase Website
In this observational study, we observed if TLS version 1.2 specifi-
cally leaks the password length when signing into We . As in the
previous study, we employed a collection platform usingWireShark
and allowed simultaneous collection on the internal and external
interfaces to easily compare the encrypted and unencrypted traffic.
During the course of these observations, it again became apparent
the encrypted traffic allowed for the determination of the plaintext
length. To ensure consistency, we reviewed that TLS version 1.2
used AES-GCM every time we signed into JP Morgan Chase from
our web browser.
Phenomena and Variables, Measures, Sample. The phenomena,
variables, measures, and sample are the same as in the Observational
Study 1 and 2.
Procedures. The procedures changed slightly for this observa-
tional study. In this study, we used Apple’s Safari web browser to
observe TLS version 1.2 traffic. This helped us understand that any
leaking of information was not exclusive to either the web browser
or transport security protocol. We then used our automated bot
to login to JP Morgan Chase’s online banking website three times
increasing the password length by one character every ten seconds.
We had a ten second delay between passwords entered, because
this helped introduce a pronounced signature when reviewing TLS
version 1.2 network traffic in WireShark. It should be noted that JP
Morgan Chase returned a lock out message, but in reality, it did not
lock us out. We are able to submit a processed query to the server
each time without being blocked. As soon as we signed in with a
legitimate account, it did not require multi-factor authentication.
Results: Password Length Leakage in QUIC. Our results suggest
the password length is easily identified in traffic analysis. The
encrypted packet length and the password length have a 1:1 to
ratio or as the password length increases by 1 character, then the
encrypted packet length increases also by 1 byte.
E DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY OVERVIEW
Differential privacy [34] is a rigorous mathematical formulation
of privacy which has emerged as the de facto standard. Intuitively,
differential privacy captures the right of any individual user to
withhold his or her personal data from a study. Informally, differ-
ential privacy ensures that any inference that can be made could
have been made whether or not a particular individual’s data was
excluded. Differential privacy does not necessarily rule out publish-
ing accurate aggregate statistics e.g., how many hospital patients
smoke, but would necessarily rule out (accurate) targeted statistics
e.g., how many patients named John Doe live in city X and have
cancer?
Password Frequency Lists. In our setting a password dataset D
consists of a list tuples (u,pwdu ) where pwdu is the password se-
lected by useru. Given a dataset D the password frequency consists
of non-negative list of integers f1 ≥ f2 ≥ . . . ≥ 0 where fi denotes
the number of users in a dataset who selected the ith most popular
password and N =
∑
fi denotes the total number of users in the
dataset We also use f ℓ1 ≥ f ℓ2 ≥ . . . ≥ 0 to denote the frequency
list for length ℓ passwords, and Nℓ =
∑
f ℓi to denote the total
number of users who selected a password of length ℓ — f ℓi denotes
the number of users who selected ith most popular password with
length ℓ.
As an example consider a toy scenario in which 12 users create
LinkedIn passwords. Suppose that f1 = 5 users select the password
“123456,” f2 = 3 users select the password “password” and f3 = 2
users select the password “abc123” and f4 = 2 users select the
password “letmein.” In this case the overall frequency list would
be (f1, f2, f3, f4) = (5, 3, 2, 2) with N = 12, but the frequency list
for length ℓ = 6 passwords would be (f 61 , f 62 ) = (5, 2) with N6 = 7
total passwords of length 6.
We remark that a password frequency list is de-anonymized
in the sense that the actual usernames and passwords have been
omitted. However, we stress that releasing a password frequency
list without noise does not satisfy the stringent requirements of
differential privacy.
Security Risks. We first discuss the potential risk of releasing
password frequency lists without any noise. In the example above
that the attacker happened to know the passwords for eleven of
these users. If only four of these eleven users selected the password
“123456” then the attacker who obtains the exact frequency list
(f1, f2, f3, f4) = (5, 3, 2, 2) abovewould be able to infer the password
of the remaining user.While this scenariomay seem a bit far-fetched
there are many examples of supposedly anonymized datasets that
were later de-anonymized when the attacker has some background
knowledge about the data e.g., [60].
Formal Definition of Differential Privacy for Password Frequency
Lists. AmechanismA which takes as input a frequency list f1, f2, . . .
with fi ≥ fi+1 and outputs a noisy frequency list is (ϵ,δ )-differentially
private if for all subsets S of output frequency lists we have
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Pr [A (f ) ∈ S] ≤ eϵ Pr [A ( f ′) ∈ S ] + δ ,
Blocki et al. [12] previously developed an (ϵ,δ )-differentially
private algorithm to publish (noisy) password frequency lists. While
their algorithm does add some noise to the data they proved that
the L1 error was small i.e.∑
i
fi − f˜i  ≤ O ©­­«
√
N + ln
(
1
δ
)
ϵ
ª®®¬ ,
where f is the original frequency list and f˜ is the noisy frequency
list output by their mechanism. Empirical analysis shows that the
L1 error is small in practice [9, 12].
Discussion. Differential privacy has several attractive features.
It provides rigorous guarantees even if the attacker already has
significant background knowledge about one or more user’s in the
dataset. Another nice feature of differential privacy is that it is
preserved under post-processing [35]. Intuitively, we can take this
mean that for any attack that an adversary might mount against a
particular individual user u the probability that the attack succeeds
(e.g., guesses the user’s password) would essentially be the same
even if we had excluded the user’s password (u,pwdu ) from the
original dataset before publishing our noisy frequency list f˜ . This
guarantee holds even if the adversary already knows the passwords
for all n− 1 other user’s. In this sense f˜ will not help the attacker to
guess any particular individual’s password. We refer an interested
reader to [12] for more discussion of differential privacy as it applies
specifically to password frequency lists, and we refer an interested
reader to the excellent textbook of Roth and Dwork [35] for more
discussion of differential privacy in general.
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